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Fertility trends by social status  
Vegard Skirbekk1  
Abstract  
This article discusses how fertility relates to social status with the use of a new dataset, 
several times larger than the ones used so far. The status-fertility relation is investigated 
over several centuries, across world regions and by the type of status-measure. The 
study reveals that as fertility declines, there is a general shift from a positive to a 
negative or neutral status-fertility relation. Those with high income/wealth or high 
occupation/social class switch from having relatively many to fewer or the same 
number of children as others. Education, however, depresses fertility for as long as this 
relation is observed (from early in the 20th century). 
  
                                                          
1
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1. Introduction  
Before the onset of fertility decline, individuals of higher social standing have 
frequently been identified to have more children compared to individuals of lower 
social standing (Betzig 1986, Razi 1980, Sogner, Randsborg and Fure 1984). With a 
decline in fertility levels, however, high status has often been found to be associated 
with relatively low fertility (e.g., Coale and Watkins 1986, Cochrane 1979, Haines 
1992, Jejeebhoy 1995), although some studies argue that the fertility-status relation 
remain positive (Fieder et al. 2005, Hull and Hull 1977, Stys 1957, Wrong 1958).  
Italy is an example of a country where the status-fertility relation switched from 
positive to negative. Livi Bacci (1977) studies three Italian cities from the 15th to the 
18th centuries and find a positive relation between status and childbearing outcomes for 
all of them. For example in Florence in 1427, poor 30-34 year old women had 3.0 
children; the middle income group had 3.6, while the richest had 4.9 children. 
Observations from 20th century Italy, however, show a negative relation between 
fertility and occupational rank/educational length (FFS 2006, Jones 1982).  
Bardet (1983) is a rare study that actually shows how the status-fertility relation 
between identical groups’ switches from positive to negative over time. Bardet studies 
marital period fertility of four social classes from 1670 to 1789 in Rouen, France. The 
two lower classes, the Artisans and the Ouvriers, had about 6 children in 1670, 
decreased their fertility slightly first from around 1730, ending at around 5 children in 
1789. However, the higher classes; the Notables, Boutiquiers and Employés, had more 
than 7 children in 1670, but substantially decreased their fertility from around 1700 and 
by 1789 had only around 4 children.  
In spite of the considerable academic interest in the status-fertility relation, there 
exists no study that reviews more than a fraction of the available evidence. In this 
investigation a dataset several times larger than the ones used so far is collected.2 The 
dataset is used to study the impact of fertility variation by status over time and during 
the demographic transition. I investigate to which extent fertility decline is initiated by 
elites and later imitated by the rest of the population. I also test whether the status-
fertility differences eventually converge when fertility levels reach replacement levels 
and below.  
I conduct separate analyses of fertility by status measures (education, 
occupation/social class/rank in a social hierarchy, income/wealth) and world region. 
                                                          
2
 Castro and Juarez (1993) present data on the relation between education and fertility based on DHS data in 
26 developing countries. Cochrane (1979) analyse the relation between education and fertility, based on 96 
samples. Pérusse (1993) presents 11 studies (mainly tribal societies) on various measures of social status and 
fertility. Jejeebhoy (1995) discusses a total of 134 samples on education and fertility, and provides a meta-
analysis of 59 of the samples. The dataset presented in this study consists of 879 samples. 
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This is done to investigate how the same status measure can affect childbearing 
differently across periods and socio-economic circumstances. For example, being 
wealthy in a pre-industrial rural setting can have made it easier to set up a new home 
and marry at a young age, while in a modern urban industrialized context, wealth could 
be related to higher consumption aspirations, which ¨may depress fertility. I also study 
fertility trends for all status measures combined. This is done to investigate how 
changes to the concept of status over time can have very different fertility implications.  
I organize the article in the following way: I begin by describing how social status 
related to fertility in historical settings as evidenced by societal/legal descriptions and 
DNA analyses. Then I go on to discuss possible causes for why high status groups were 
likely to reduce their fertility first, including their relatively early mortality decline, 
better contraceptive knowledge and weaker religious beliefs. The sample selection 
procedure for generating the status-fertility dataset is then presented. The final part 
presents the findings, where also the outlook for future childbearing trends by status is 
discussed.  
 
 
2. Social status and fertility differences  
One important reason why fertility outcomes once correlated with a man’s social rank 
was that status increased the number of sexual partners or wives. The positive 
association between status level and sexual access to women has been identified for 
several pre-demographic transition societies, including Celts, German tribes, 
Macedonians, Persians, Egyptians, African tribes, Mongolians, Chinese and Indians 
(Betzig 1986, Scheidel 2000). Except for the Greek polis, and the roman republic, 
where monogamous marriage contracts was the norm also for society’s leaders 
(although they anyway are likely to have had many out-of-wedlock-offspring), most 
human societies allowed and expected high ranking men to have more than one wife.  
In China, the head of the Ch’i dynasty had sexual access to several thousands of 
women in his palace (van Gulick 1974), while among the Yoruba in Africa, landowners 
and warlords had multiple wives, some even hundreds (Lovejoy 1983). Even in hunting 
and gathering subsistence economies that once were described as un-stratified societies, 
a positive relation between reproductive success and individual’s resources, power and 
influence has been observed. This includes the !Kung of the Dobe area in Botswana or 
the Murngim in Arnhem Land, Northern Australia (Berndt and Berndt 1964, Hill 1984, 
Marshall 1976).  
Evidence on the prevalence of certain DNA structures revealing common ancestry 
may provide important information on the relation between social rank and childbearing 
outcomes. Zerjal et al. (2003) show that 0.5% of the current world male population 
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share a certain Y chromosome signature and therefore one male ancestor. This 
individual, who Zerjal et al. suggest is Genghis Khan, is likely to have fathered a very 
high number of children in Eurasia around the 12th-13th century. Xue et al. (2005) 
identify, also through DNA samples, another highly prolific historic male in China, 
possibly Giocangga, grandfather of the first emperor in the Qing-dynasty that ruled 
China 1644-1912. Blood drawn from men in northwest Ireland (Moore et al. 2006) 
reveal that 20% of the population have a joint male ancestor, possibly a 5th century 
chieftain called Niall of the Nine Hostages (the specific Y chromosome signature is also 
significantly more common among men with surnames genealogically linked to the last 
known relative of this chieftain’s dynasty). These studies reveal that a few men 
(regardless of whether they actually were the historical characters suggested), had a 
very high number of children, which is likely to have occurred in social systems where 
high social rank granted sexual access to a large number of women.  
Male fertility can be positively associated with hierarchy position when access to 
sexual partners and basic resources relate to status (Ellis 2001, Irons 1979). Boyd and 
Richerson (1985) argue that all traits of high status model individuals, including the 
relatively recent phenomenon of small family size, is preferentially imitated by others 
in the population, irrespective of whether these traits contribute to the models’ success. 
When attaining status is likely to decrease long-term reproductive success, biologists 
may describe status-seeking as evolutionary “maladaptive” (Dieckmann and Ferrière 
2004, Falster and Westoby 2003).  
Historical fertility patterns in Europe were strongly influenced by low levels of 
extramarital childbearing combined with a late marriage age and substantial population 
shares that never married (Hajnal 1965). As there were social status differences in 
marital timing and the proportion remaining unmarried, this could provide part of the 
answer to why lower status groups had relatively low fertility before the onset of 
fertility decline (Bongaarts and Menken 1983, Knodel 1983, Knodel 1988, Wilson 
1984). Knodel (1988), for instance, in a study of German villages 1700-1899, shows 
that wives of village leaders got married when they were 2.1 years younger than wives 
of non village-leaders. 
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3. Fertility limitation among elites 
Several factors causing a reduction in fertility affected high status groups before they 
had a similar impact on the rest of the population. Knowledge and practice of traditional 
birth control methods is likely to first have been practiced by high status groups who 
were more exposed to different ideas and knowledge (Cleland 2001). Contraceptive use 
correlates with education and income also in contemporary societies (Jejeebhoy 1995, 
Kanazawa 2003). Infanticide may also positively correlate with status, and has been 
found to be more common among high-caste communities than among the rest of the 
population in northern India in the 1980s (Sudha and Rajan 1999).  
Mortality has in several studies been found to be similar between the social classes 
before the demographic transition in Europe (Knodel 1983, Livi Bacci 1991, Surault 
1979). Gadeyne (2006) writes: “In general, it is accepted that socio-economic mortality 
differences were rather limited in pre-industrial Europe“. However, the decrease in 
mortality that followed increased hygiene, better nutrition, less strenuous lifestyles and 
better medical treatment is first likely to have affected the higher social classes. As 
mortality declined, a general tendency emerged that status relates to life expectancy, 
which is still evident (Marmot 2004).  
If uncertainty is high, childbearing may be perceived as a basic social insurance, as 
children may support parents when they become frail and dependent on transfers. 
Effective social security systems that provide support in old age could therefore reduce 
fertility preferences (Cain 1983). Social security schemes are more likely to first have 
been utilized by the upper social echelons. For example, evidence from medieval 
Germany shows that monasteries receiving gifts from wealthier individuals repaid the 
contributors as they grew old through the provision of old age care and support (Lyon 
2006).  
The fertility decline occurred as female labour force participation increased, a 
cultural transition took place with rising material aspirations, individualisation and 
changes in gender roles – which may particularly have affected fertility of high status 
groups (Brown and Guinnane 2002, Caldwell 1999, Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986, 
Matysiak and Vignoli 2006, Sathar and Kazi 1990). The effect of religion on fertility 
may also play an important role, as secularisation and liberal interpretations of religion 
is more common among the more educated (Banu 1992, Sacerdote and Glaeser 2001), 
and those with weaker religious beliefs tend to have lower fertility (Schellekens and van 
Poppel 2006, Goujon et al. 2007).  
In most pre-fertility transition settings, social mobility was limited, and inherited 
land and wealth meant children’s opportunities were largely predetermined by parents’ 
social rank (Grusky 1994). In contemporary societies, status is to a much larger extent 
attained through personal achievement rather than parents’ social standing. Striving to 
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for status in modern societies requires time; higher education attainment consuming, 
finding a job and climbing the career ladder, buying a car and a house, identifying a 
spouse and attaining financial security can take many years of reproductive life and 
imply postponed and reduced fertility.   
Education is increasingly important to attain or maintain social status and to be 
competitive in marriage markets characterised by rising education levels and increased 
educational homogamy (Lutz et al. 2007, Smits, Ultee and Lammers 2000). Education 
can affect preferences for fertility timing and outcomes, raise female autonomy, 
increase contraceptive use and raise the opportunity costs of childbearing (Jejeebhoy 
1995, Kravdal and Rindfuss 2007, Skirbekk, Kohler and Prskawetz 2004). Jain (1981) 
and Gustavsson (2006) argue that education can reduce fertility strongly if opportunity 
costs increase with schooling, which for example could be the case when labour force 
participation rates correlate with educational levels.  
Declining fertility among high status groups can also lead to self-reinforcing 
effects. Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa (2006) argue that ideational/normative fertility 
preferences affect family size, and if actual fertility for one generation is lower, the 
fertility preferences of the next generation will also be lower. Moreover, particularly for 
upper social echelons, increasing consumption aspirations and wealthier reference 
groups can imply higher opportunity costs of childbearing and reduced fertility.  
The perception that the number of children may be inversely related to their 
success – that there is a tradeoff between the children’s quality and quantity – could 
decrease fertility preferences among those most concerned with the status attainment of 
their offspring (Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser 2006, Becker 1991, Black, Devereux and 
Salvanes 2005). Ryan-Johansson (1987) suggests that the low fertility of European 
rulers between 1500-1924 was caused the fear that too many children could lead to 
wealth dilution and a reduction in social status.  
Attaining status rather than maintaining status can relate to especially low fertility 
(Baltzell 1953, Røskraft, Wara and Viken 1992, van Bavel 2006). Van Bavel studies an 
urban Belgian population during the demographic transition and finds that those who 
reduced their fertility most had the strongest increase in social status.  
Also ideational change stemming from concerns about growing human pressure on 
the environment may influence fertility decisions. A report commissioned by the Dutch 
government (van de Kaa and van der Windt 1979) concluded: “We recommend the 
government to aim for an end to natural population growth as fast as possible”. Studies 
arguing that one should decrease population growth in order to contribute to 
environmental sustainability may have affected fertility preferences particularly among 
the tertiary educated, as the discussion on the impact of population growth on the 
environment took place in university environments (Ehrlich 1968, Meadows et al. 
1972).  
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4. Data inclusion criteria 
Having explained possible reasons for the status-fertility reversal, we now turn over to 
the empirical evidence. I construct a dataset in order to investigate the relation between 
social status and fertility in all societies and periods where samples are available. To be 
included in this dataset, each sample must have a measure of fertility by social status 
(education, occupation/social class/rank in a social hierarchy, income/wealth). Data on 
minimum two social status groups are required for the sample to be included. 
Several search procedures were used to identify studies that describe the relation 
between social status and fertility in quantitative terms. Relevant references from the 
following literature reviews were included: Castro and Juarez 1993, Cochrane 1979, 
Jejeebhoy 1995, Jones 1982 and Pérusse 1993. I searched for studies containing the 
keywords: “education” and “fertility”, “status” and fertility”, “differential fertility”, or 
“fertility differences” in Popline, Medline, Scopus, JSTOR and scholar.google. The 
following journals were manually searched: Demography, Population and Development 
Review, Population Studies, Journal of Biosocial Science, Studies in Family Planning 
and International Family Planning Perspectives. In addition, descriptive results from all 
countries included in Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Family and Fertility 
Survey (FFS), Reproductive Health Survey (RHS) and World Value Survey (WVS) 
were included. Finally, experts were consulted and reference lists in the collected 
studies were examined in order to identify additional data. Studies published until 2006 
were taken into account.  
This procedure produces a dataset of 909 samples. I exclude 30 samples where 
only a coefficient on the fertility effect of education is available. The final data set 
consists of 879 samples from 129 sources. A list of all the references used in the meta-
analysis is found in the appendix, and the data is available online (http:// 
www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol18/5/files/StatusFertilityDataset.xls). 
Observed correlations between social status and fertility levels are recalculated in a 
standardised way to produce comparable indicators. I present the information in terms 
of the relative fertility of the highest status group relative to the lowest status group in 
each sample, [FertilityHigh status-FertilityLow Status]/ FertilityLow Status (see Figures 1-5 and 
Tables 1-3). I also present the total number of samples, k, and the number of positive 
samples, l in Tables 1-3 (joint and by region/status measure). 
Several different measures of fertility are included in the database. Children Ever 
Born represents 782 of the samples, followed by Total Fertility Rate or Total Marital 
Fertility Rate (81 samples), births within a given duration (7 samples), Birth Rates (5 
samples) and Live births (4 samples). 18 samples are from before year 1750, 37 
samples from 1750 to 1900, 22 from the years 1901-1924, 32 from 1925-1949, 127 
from 1950-1974, 192 from the 1975-1989 and 451 samples from 1990-2006. The 
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samples from before 1800 are predominantly European, while more recent samples 
come from all world regions.  
If “Children Ever Born” data are available for different age groups, only those 
aged 40 and above are included. For the few studies where fertility data is reported for 
every 1- or 5-year period in a period spanning more than 20 years, fertility differences 
for individuals born every 20 years apart are reported. If the same sample using the 
same status measure is considered in more than one study, only one sample is used.  
Status in our dataset is predominantly own adult status (769 samples), followed by 
husband’s status (102 samples) and in a few samples parents’ status (13 samples). 
Hence, the status measure usually refers to adult status and not to status given by birth. 
The most common status measure is education (528 samples), income/wealth (243 
samples) followed by occupation/social class (108 samples).  
I divide the sample in two world regions: Europe and North America (where the 
fertility reduction, and therefore possibly changes in the status-fertility relation, took 
place at an earlier period) and Asia, Africa, Latin-America and the Middle-East. There 
are 497 samples from North America and Europe and 382 samples from Asia, Africa, 
Latin-America and the Middle-East.   
Number of status categories differed from 2 to 14 categories; 619 samples had 2-3 
categories, 208 had 4-5 categories, 38 had 6-7 categories and only 19 samples had 8 or 
more categories. I report the highest and lowest status category for all samples. For the 
studies with 3 or more categories, I also report the middle category, and if there is an 
even number of categories, e.g. 4 or 8 categories, I define the middle group as upper 
middle, e.g. 3rd or 5th categories, respectively. 
Sample size is not available for 164 of the 879 samples. For where sample size 
information is available, 335 of the samples are below 500 individuals (71 of which are 
between 29 and 100), 73 samples consist of 501-2 000 individuals, 237 samples range 
from 2 001-10 000 individuals and 70 samples have more than 10 000 individuals. Until 
year 1800 sample size ranges from 101 to 10 923 individuals, and sources tend to be 
genealogies, parish registers, tax records and other official registers. Samples from 
recent years are frequently compiled from surveys and population censuses.  
 
 
5. Findings and conclusion 
Figure 1 shows the relation between fertility and all status measures for all countries 
over time. The vertical axis shows the relative percentage fertility gain for high status 
group relative to low status groups, [FertilityHigh status-FertilityLow Status]/ FertilityLow Status, 
which means that a value of “50” implies that the high status groups had 50% higher 
fertility than the low status group.  
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The fitted quadratic curve in Figure 1 reveals a shift from a positive to a negative 
status-fertility relation from the 13th to the 21st century. The negative effects in recent 
periods are, however, of considerably smaller magnitude than the positive effects before 
the fertility decline. Hence I find support for Haines’ (1992, p. 224) argument that: 
“fertility decline was ‘led’ by the middle and upper classes. Social elites apparently did 
act as leaders in modifying this most basic of activities – human reproduction. The 
evidence can therefore be said to support a “leader-follower” model of fertility change 
(Bongaarts 2003, Cochrane 1979, Jejeebhoy 1995).”  
 
Figure 1: Percentage fertility difference, high relative to low status individuals 
by period. All countries. All Measures. R2 (adj.) for the fitted 
curve=0.09  
 
-
10
0
-
50
0
50
10
0
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Period
95% CI All
Education Income, Wealth
Occupation, Social Class
Skirbekk: Fertility trends by social status  
154  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Figure 2 shows the separate trends describing how different status measures 
(occupation/social class, income/wealth and education) relate to fertility from 1270-
2006. Over this period, those with high occupation/social class switch from having 
more children to have slightly fewer children than those with low status. High 
income/wealth switches from having a positive to a neutral fertility effect, while the 
fertility effect of education is negative for as long as this relation has been measured3. 
The current negative relation between overall status and fertility shown in Figure 1 is 
due to the fact that education is the most frequent status measure, and that 
income/wealth and occupation/social class have a neutral or slight negative fertility 
effect. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage difference in fertility for high relative to low status 
individuals by Period. All countries. By Status Measure. R2 (adj.) for 
the Income Trend=0.01. R2 (adj.) for the Occupation, Social Class 
Trend=0.19. R2 (adj.) for the Education Trend=0.00  
 
                                                          
3
 Samples describing how education relates to fertility first appear early in the 20th century. From around 
1950 education is the most common measure of fertility. 
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Fertility differentials over time for Asia, Africa, Latin-America and the Middle 
East is shown in Figure 3, while data for Europe and North-America is shown in Figure 
4. Fertility differentials by status measure, period and world region are presented in 
detail in Table 1. For the whole world before 1750 a positive fertility-status relation is 
found in most (15 out of 18) samples, while from 1750-1900 less than half (15 out of 
37) of the samples are positive, and in 1900-2006 less than a quarter (201 of 824 
samples) are positive. For Europe and North America, high status groups have more 
children until 1750, but less from 1750 and thereafter, and for Asia, Africa, Latin-
America and the Middle East, a negative effect is found only from the 20th century, 
suggesting a much later fertility-status reversal (most likely due to the later fertility 
transition in these world regions). An important fact to be kept in mind while 
interpreting the regional findings is that Asia, Africa, Latin-America and the Middle 
East may be more culturally and economically heterogeneous as compared to Europe 
and North America.  
 
Figure 3: Percentage difference in fertility for high relative to low status 
individuals by period. Asia, Africa, Latin-America and the Middle-
East, All Status Measures. All periods. R2 (adj.) for the fitted 
curve=0.11  
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Figure 4: Percentage difference in fertility for high relative to low status 
individuals by period. Europe and North America. All Status 
Measures. R2 (adj.) for the fitted curve=0.10  
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Table 1: Status and fertility for highest relative to lowest status group across 
world regions over time  
 
 
 
Before 
1750 
1750-
1899 
1900-
1924 
1925-
1949 
1950-
1974 
1975-
1989 
1990-
2006 
All 
periods 
All Status groups All countries d 35.8 -2.9 -15.1 -1.8 -14.4 -15.4 -19.1 -15.7 
 
 k 18 37 22 32 127 192 451 879 
 
 l 15 15 6 6 41 51 97 231 
 d 35.8 -8.2 -15.1 -17.0 -15.5 -5.2 -9.0 -8.1 
 k 18 33 22 26 58 93 248 497 
 
Europe and North 
America 
l 15 11 6 5 14 33 87 171 
 d  40.7  -22.9 -13.4 -25.0 -31.3 -25.6 
 k  4  6 69 99 203 382 
 
Asia, Africa,  
Middle East,  
Latin-America l  4  1 27 18 10 60 
Income/wealth All countries d 24.3 -8.9 6.1 -13.2 2.4 1.9 2.7 0.5 
 
 k 2 14 6 22 19 73 107 243 
 
 l 2 6 3 5 10 34 62 122 
 d 24.3 -45.0 6.1 -12.4 -13.9 2.3 6.7 1.3 
 k 2 12 6 20 8 67 87 202 
 
Europe and North 
America 
l 2 4 3 5 1 31 57 103 
 d  29.5  -21.0 14.2 -2.1 -14.9 -3.4 
 k  2  2 11 6 20 41 
 
Asia, Africa,  
Middle East,  
Latin-America l  2   9 3 5 19 
All countries d 49.1 32.0 -22.3 -22.4 -3.3 21.4 -15.9 0.8 Occupation/ 
social class 
 k 16 23 15 4 34 7 9 108 
 
 l 13 9 3 1 14 5 1 46 
 d 30.9 -4.2 -22.3 -45.6 -6.0  -7.9 -0.9 
 k 16 21 15 2 19  5 78 
 
Europe and North 
America 
l 13 7 3  8  1 32 
 d  51.9  0.7 0.2 21.4 -25.9 5.1 
 k  2  2 15 7 4 30 
 
Asia, Africa,  
Middle East,  
Latin-America l  2  1 6 5  14 
Education All countries d   -35.7 -33.3 -23.8 -29.0 -26.1 -26.5 
 
 k   1 6 74 112 335 528 
 
 l   0 0 17 12 34 63 
 d   -35.7 -25.8 -21.8 -24.6 -17.8 -19.4 
 k   1 4 31 25 156 217 
 
Europe and North 
America 
l     5 2 29 36 
 d    -48.4 -25.2 -30.4 -33.3 -31.5 
 k    2 43 87 179 311 
 
Asia, Africa, Middle 
East, Latin-America 
l     12 10 5 27 
 
Note: The variable d is the relative fertility of the high status group, [FertilityHigh status-FertilityLow Status]/ FertilityLow Status, k 
indicates the number of samples, and l refers to the number of samples where d>0 
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Education becomes a common status indicator early in the 20th century and 
bypasses income/wealth in the 1950-1974 period as the most common measure of 
status, as shown in Table 1. The relation between education and average fertility is 
always negative, and depresses fertility by 26.5% on average for all periods. Separate 
analysis of men and women indicate that the fertility depressing effect of schooling is 
considerably stronger for women than for men for all periods. For example, in the 
period 1990-2006 for the whole world, highly educated women have 29.9% fewer 
children than women with low education, while highly educated men have 11.6% fewer 
children than low educated women. The stronger fertility impact of female education is 
found both in Europe and North America as well as Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin 
America. 
Figure 5 shows how status differences in fertility differ when average fertility is at 
the horizontal axis (all periods and all countries). Presenting the findings according to 
average fertility reveals how status differences relate to the fertility decline – as the 
demographic transition was initiated at different periods in different countries. 
Differences in fertility levels are narrow at the highest average fertility levels, but as 
fertility levels decline, elites are the first to reduce their fertility, producing a negative 
status-fertility relation. When fertility is close to replacement levels, the fertility 
differences between high and low status groups are again small (although variation is 
high and education is still negatively related to fertility). 
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Figure 5: Percentage difference in fertility for high relative to low status 
individuals by average fertility of status groups. All countries. All 
Status Measures. R2 (adj.) for the fitted curve=0.07  
-
10
0
-
50
0
50
10
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fertility (average of both status groups)
95 % CI Income, Wealth Trend
Occupation, Social Class Trend Education
 Income, Wealth
 
 
Figures 1-5 reveal large variation in the status-fertility relation at each period and 
fertility level – also when disaggregating by world region or status-measure. The 
quadratic functions only explain a small part of the variation; R-squared (adjusted) 
values range from 0.00 to 0.19. However, the current study focuses on presenting new 
data describing broad fertility-status trends over time and demographic development, 
and not variation between societies. Among the factors that are likely to have a strong 
effect on childbearing differentials in different societies are social inequalities in female 
labour force participation, mortality, childbearing norms and contraceptive practice. 
Further research on this topic is needed. 
Inferring from the evidence on declining fertility differentials, the question arises 
as of whether status differentials will converge. Of particular interest is to which extent 
education will continue to negatively affect fertility in the coming years. For 
Norwegians born 1935-58, cohort fertility for women with advanced tertiary degrees 
fell from 2.1 to 1.9 children while for those with primary school, it fell from 2.5 to 2.1, 
narrowing the education-fertility gap from 0.4 to 0.2 children. However, during the last 
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few recent decades in Belgium, Sweden, Germany and Japan, the fertility gap between 
high and low educated has not converged (Björklund 2006, Retherford et al. 2004). 
Moreover, in the US 1960-1990 the gap between college and non-college educated 
women widened from 0.3 to 0.5 children as TFR fell from 3.7 to 2.1 children 
(Statistical abstract of the United States 2001, Yang and Morgan 2003). On the basis of 
data from 57 less developed countries, Bongaarts and Menken (1983) suggests that 
even where fertility approaches replacement levels, the tertiary educated will continue 
to have low fertility as the more educated still prefer smaller families.  
Jejeebhoy (1995) and Essock-Vitale (1984) put forward evidence suggesting that 
the status-fertility relation need not be linear, as increased status may first increase 
fertility and thereafter decrease it. Moreover, as the “high” and the “low” can in 
different samples represent different proportions of the population, which could relate 
to different degrees of selection, I also consider the middle status group.  I therefore 
look at the fertility differences between those with low and middle status (Table 2) and 
between those with middle and high status (Table 3). These tables show that in general 
increasing status from low to medium status and from medium to high status implies 
higher fertility until the mid 18th century, and lower fertility for later periods. From 
1750-2006, occupation/social class tend to be negatively related to fertility (positive in 
only 12 out of 49 samples from both low to middle and middle to high status) while the 
income/wealth-fertility relation is more ambiguous (94 of 226 samples from low to 
middle and 108 of 226 samples from middle to high status are positive). Fertility drops 
in most cases from lowest to middle education levels (only 104 out of 506 samples have 
a positive relation) and the negative relation is even more common when one compares 
middle education with highest education levels (where 64 out of 506 samples have a 
positive relation).  
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Table 2: Status and fertility for middle relative to lowest status group across 
world regions over time  
   Before 
1750 
1750-
1899 
1900-
1924 
1925-
1949 
1950-
1974 
1975-
1989 
1990-
2006 
All 
periods 
All Status groups All countries d 20.3 -6.3 -3.5 -8.3 -5.8 -5.1 -7.8 -6.5 
  k 10 21 17 30 91 176 446 791 
  l 7 5 6 9 29 63 112 231 
Income/wealth All countries d -14.7 -12.4 10.7 -2.8 -2.6 -2.0 2.2 -0.4 
  k 1 9 4 20 15 71 107 227 
  l  3 3 8 5 33 56 108 
Occupation/ 
social class 
All countries d 24.3 -1.8 -7.1 -10.6 4.3 1.2 -12.6 0.0 
  k 9 12 12 4 10 2 9 58 
  l 7 2 3 1 4 1 1 19 
Education All countries d   -17.1 -25.1 -8.0 -7.4 -10.9 -10.0 
  k   1 6 66 103 330 506 
  l     20 29 55 104 
 
Note: The variable d is the relative fertility of the high status group, [FertilityMiddle status-FertilityLow Status]/ FertilityLow Status, k indicates the 
number of samples, and l refers to the number of samples where d>0 
 
Table 3: Fertility for high status group relative to middle status group across 
world regions over time  
   Before 
1750 
1750-
1899 
1900-
1924 
1925-
1949 
1950-
1974 
1975-
1989 
1990-
2006 
All 
periods 
All Status groups All countries d 14.2 -12.5 -8.3 -11.8 -12.9 -13.6 -12.6 -12.2 
  k 10 21 17 30 91 176 446 791 
  l 8 7 5 6 21 42 89 178 
Income/wealth All countries d 36.8 -22.8 11.9 -11.2 -3.0 3.7 1.3 0.1 
  k 1 9 4 20 15 71 107 227 
  l 1 2 3 3 5 35 46 95 
Occupation/ 
social class 
All countries d 11.7 -4.7 -13.9 -15.7 -12.0 -20.1 -5.6 -6.7 
  k 9 12 12 4 10 2 9 58 
  l 7 5 2 1 1  3 19 
Education All countries d   -22.4 -11.2 -15.3 -25.3 -17.3 -18.6 
  k   1 6 66 103 330 506 
  l    2 15 7 40 64 
 
Note: The variable d is the relative fertility of the high status group, [FertilityHigh status-FertilityMiddle Status]/ FertilityMiddle Status, k indicates 
the number of samples, and l refers to the number of samples where d>0 
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In sum, I find that before the fertility decline high status was associated with 
relatively high fertility, but thereafter had a neutral or negative fertility effect. The 
switch towards a more negative status-fertility relation is found to be more pronounced 
for Asia, Africa, Latin-America and the Middle-East than for Europe and North 
America. Contemporary fertility differences by status are, however, much smaller than 
historical ones as there has been a partial convergence in fertility levels. Individuals 
with high occupation/social class have slightly lower fertility, while those with high 
income/wealth have about the same fertility as those less well off. Education has 
become an increasingly important determinant of status during the 20th century. Since 
the education-fertility relation is more negative, this implies that the overall status-
fertility relation is more negative.  
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